444 723 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES The plaintiffs are the family members and estates of Carmelo and Pablo.3 Plaintiffs allege that the Lod Airport Attack was carried out as a joint operation by the Japanese Red Army (‘‘JRA’’) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (‘‘PFLP’’) terrorist organizations, with the material support of the named defendants, the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (‘‘North Korea’’) and North Korea’s Cabinet General Intelligence Bureau (‘‘CGIB’’) (‘‘defendants’’).4 Plaintiffs’ Complaint was filed on March 27, 2008. (Docket No. 1) As required by section 1608(a)-(b) of the FSIA, the Clerk initiated service of process on the defendants, which process included copies of the Complaint, summonses and a Notice of Suit, and Korean-language translations of those documents. (Docket No. 7) Service was effected on North Korea and CGIB on July 21, 2008, pursuant to the provisions of FSIA section 1608(a)-(b). (Docket No. 8) After the sixty-day period provided by section 1608 had passed without the defendants filing an answer or otherwise responding to this action, plaintiffs moved for entry of default against defendants pursuant to Rule 55(a). (Docket No. 8) On October 31, 2008, the Court entered default against defendants North Korea and CGIB. (Docket No. 9) Notwithstanding defendants’ default, the FSIA requires that a default judgment against a foreign state be entered only after a plaintiff ‘‘establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the Court.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). this case unless it finds that the plaintiffs have shown ‘‘by evidence that is satisfactory to the Court’’ that the Court has jurisdiction and that the defendants are liable. See e.g. Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F.Supp.2d 1, 12 (D.D.C.2005) (‘‘Every case brought against a foreign state raises two distinct and crucial legal questions. First, the Court must look to whether it has jurisdiction to hear the claim. In the context of claims implicating the parameters of the FSIA, this jurisdictional determination is guided by an inquiry into whether the case falls within one of the statutory exceptions to the sovereign immunity of a foreign state. Second, the Court must consider the actual liability of the defendant foreign sovereign.’’) (citations omitted). At the same time, pursuant to section 1608(e) ‘‘the Court may accept as true the plaintiffs’ uncontroverted evidence.’’ Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 603 F.Supp.2d 148, 155 (D.D.C.2009) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F.Supp.2d 97, 100 (D.D.C.2000)). See also Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 604 F.Supp.2d 22, 26 (D.D.C.2009) (same); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F.Supp.2d 53, 63 (D.D.C.2008) (same); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F.Supp. 1239, 1243 (S.D.Fla.1997) (same). Thus, pursuant to section 1608(e), this Court cannot enter default judgment in The ‘‘satisfactory to the court’’ standard contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) is identical to the standard for entry of default judgments against the United States government in Rule 55(e). Compañia Interamericana Export–Import, S.A. v. Compañia Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948, 951 (1996). 3. 4. Additionally, the estates and heirs of various family members of Carmelo and Pablo who passed away in the years since the attack are also plaintiffs. The Complaint also names as defendants ‘‘John Does 1–10,’’ but because these defendants have neither been identified nor served, they are dismissed from this action.