56 356 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES Ph.D. from Northwestern University. Koch Report at 12. Mr. Koch accounted for Otto’s life expectancy and work life expectancy, as well as Otto’s ‘‘exceptional[ ] talent[ ],’’ ‘‘academic success at UVA,’’ ‘‘his attendance at the London School of Economics,’’ and his ‘‘signal selection’’ as a ‘‘highly compensated summer intern’’ at Millstein, a New York City investment firm. Id. at 2–3. Mr. Koch then ran three models. Id. at 3. The first assumed Otto would reject the ‘‘possibility of Wall Street’’ and instead earn the income of a ‘‘typical University of Virginia graduate,’’ and the second assumed Otto would work at Millstein or a ‘‘comparable Wall Street firm and do[ ] good work, but TTT not [be] a star.’’ Id. The third model assumed Otto would work at Millstein or a ‘‘comparable Wall Street firm,’’ and ‘‘advance[ ] to [the] position of Director after twenty years.’’ Id. Relying on his own ‘‘education, training and experience, and accounting for the realities of the marketplace,’’ Mr. Koch concluded, after reviewing Otto’s case, that the third model provided the ‘‘most credible’’ estimate of ‘‘losses suffered by [Otto’s] estate,’’ at $ 6,038,308. Id. at 4. Despite the obvious assumptions underlying this model, Otto excelled at all that he set out to do in his young life, and his ‘‘driven’’ nature, H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 58 (C. W.), makes highly plausible that this success would have continued. Accordingly, Otto’s estate is awarded $ 6,038,308 for his estimated economic losses as a result of North Korea’s heinous treatment of him. The plaintiffs also seek to recover Otto’s medical expenses, Compl. at 21, and have submitted satisfactory evidence of those expenses, reflected in itemized medical bills totaling $ 96,375.80, see Hatch Medical Expenses Decl. ¶ 6; see also id., Ex. A (UC Health Itemization of Otto’s Hospital Services); id., Ex. B (UC Health Itemization for Physician Providers); id., Ex. C (UC Health Email Summary of Ex. B). See Levin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 529 F.Supp.2d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2007) (‘‘[P]laintiffs, through their own testimony, have reasonably proven the costs incurred as a result of past medical expenses.’’); Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F.Supp.2d 258, 275 (D.D.C. 2003) (‘‘[Plaintiff] has also requested damages for his past medical expenses and has ‘reasonably proven’ these expenses through the testimony of his mother.’’). [27] Although plaintiffs’ counsel represented at the evidentiary hearing that insurance ‘‘covered part of’’ these expenses, H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 134, Otto’s medical expenses are still recoverable in full. ‘‘[A] district court may rely on well-established statements of common law, found in state reporters, the Restatement of Torts, and other respected treatises, in determining damages under § 1605A(c).’’ Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 353. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that ‘‘[p]ayments made or benefits conferred by’’ collateral sources ‘‘do not have the effect of reducing the recovery against the defendant.’’ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979). Therefore, Otto’s estate is awarded $ 96,375.80 for Otto’s medical expenses. 3. Pain and Suffering (Otto’s Estate) [28, 29] ‘‘[W]hen assessing damages for surviving victims of terrorist hostilities,’’ the ‘‘baseline assumption’’ is that ‘‘ ‘persons suffering injuries in terrorist attacks are entitled to $ 5 million in damages.’ ’’ Kaplan v. Hezbollah, 213 F.Supp.3d 27, 35 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Davis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 882 F.Supp.2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2012) ). This baseline may be moderated either upward or downward. An upward departure would be warranted ‘‘in the presence of ‘severe instances of physical and psychological pain, such as where victims suffered relatively more numerous