32 950 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES dating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind. TVPA, Pub. L. No. 102–256, § 3(b)(1), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992). The amended complaint also alleges that Reverend Kim was ‘‘tortured to death by officers, employees and agents of defendant North Korea[,]’’ Am. Compl. ¶ 27, and that Reverend Kim’s ‘‘murder’’ thus qualifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A as an extrajudicial killing, id. ¶ 33. The FSIA adopts the definition of extrajudicial killing contained in the TVPA: ‘‘a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.’’ TVPA, Pub. L. No. 102–256, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992). Courts have found that extrajudicial killing occurs, for example, where a defendant deliberately kills individuals by a targeted or deliberate bombing, see, e.g., Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 826 F.Supp.2d 128, 150 (D.D.C.2011); Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F.Supp.2d 52, 74 (D.D.C.2010), or deliberately assassinates or executes an individual, see Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F.3d 835, 839–40 (D.C.Cir. 2009); Kilburn, 699 F.Supp.2d at 152–53; Bakhtiar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 571 F.Supp.2d 27, 34 (D.D.C.2008). Here, plaintiffs have not alleged a targeted bombing or a deliberate execution. Instead, by alleging that Reverend Kim was tortured to death and that this murder qualifies as an extrajudicial killing, the plaintiffs must show that North Korean agents deliberately killed Reverend Kim by torturing him. Thus, the plaintiffs’ extrajudicial killing claim relies squarely upon an adequate showing that Reverend Kim was tortured. The D.C. Circuit has emphasized the high standard that the statutory definition of torture imposes. In Price, an interlocu- tory appeal of a district court order rejecting Libya’s claim of sovereign immunity in its motion to dismiss, the court of appeals considered the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations of torture. The circuit’s reasoning merits recounting in some detail: The severity requirement is crucial to ensuring that the conduct proscribed by the Convention and the TVPA is sufficiently extreme and outrageous to warrant the universal condemnation that the term ‘torture’ both connotes and invokesTTTT [O]nly acts of a certain gravity shall be considered to constitute torture TTTT The term ‘torture,’ TTT is usually reserved for extreme, deliberate and unusually cruel practices, for example, sustained systematic beating, application of electric currents to sensitive parts of the body, and tying up or hanging in positions that cause extreme painTTTT The critical issue is the degree of pain and suffering that the alleged torturer intended to, and actually did, inflict upon the victim. The more intense, lasting, or heinous the agony, the more likely it is to be tortureTTTT [I]n order to constitute torture, an act must be a deliberate and calculated act of an extremely cruel and inhuman nature, specifically intended to inflict excruciating and agonizing physical or mental pain or sufferingTTTT [T]orture does not automatically result whenever individuals in official custody are subjected even to direct physical assault. Not all police brutality, not every instance of excessive force used against prisoners, is torture under the FSIATTTT [I]t is especially important for the courts to ensure that foreign states are not stripped of their sovereign immunity unless they have been charged with actual torture, and not mere police brutality. Price, 294 F.3d at 92–93 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In addition,