HAN KIM v. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA Cite as 950 F.Supp.2d 29 (D.D.C. 2013) the acts of torture or the parts of the body at which they were aimed or any weapons used to carry them out. IV. JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE Section 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) provides in relevant part that a court shall hear a claim under § 1605A against a foreign state if that state ‘‘was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the [torture or extrajudicial killing] occurred, TTT and TTT either remains so designated when the claim is filed under this section or was so designated within the 6–month period before the claim is filed under this section[.]’’ North Korea was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1988. See Notice, Determination Pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979; North Korea, 53 Fed.Reg. 3477–01 (Feb. 5, 1988). North Korea’s designation was rescinded on October 11, 2008. See Notice, Rescission of Determination Regarding North Korea, 73 Fed. Reg. 63540–01 (Oct. 24, 2008). Thus, North Korea remained designated as a state sponsor of terrorism within the 6– month period before this action was filed on April 8, 2009. Section 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) further requires that ‘‘the claimant or the victim was, at the time the act TTT occurred TTT a national of the United States.’’ An individual deemed to owe a permanent allegiance to the United States and who actively pursues U.S. citizenship can be held to be a ‘‘national of the United States’’ in satisfaction of § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I). See, e.g., Saludes v. Republica de Cuba, 577 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1252 (S.D.Fla.2008). At the time of Reverend Kim’s abduction, plaintiff Yong Kim was a U.S. citizen and plaintiff Han Kim can be deemed to have been a U.S. national. He had lived in the U.S. since 1992 and became a Permanent Resident owing a permanent allegiance to the U.S. In 1999, before his father’s abduction, he began the application process to 41 become a naturalized American citizen with the intention of remaining in this country. Supplemental Declaration of Han Kim at 1–2. [5, 6] For any ‘‘production of pain’’ to constitute torture under the TVPA definition, the act must be ‘‘purposive, and not merely haphazard TTT [or] the unforeseen or unavoidable incident of some legitimate end.’’ Price, 294 F.3d at 93. Plaintiffs’ proffered evidence includes expert opinions, a type of evidence that courts have credited in FSIA default actions. See Kilburn, 699 F.Supp.2d at 143, 152. Hawk asserts that DPRK’s policy is to imprison ‘‘political prisoners and others deemed to be opponents of the DPRK regime’’ to ‘‘deter dissent in the larger population[.]’’ Hawk Decl. ¶ 10. Hawk and Downs state that Reverend Kim was targeted by DPRK because of his ‘‘humanitarian activities’’ and because he was a Christian missionary who assisted North Korean defectors. Hawk Decl. ¶ 21; Downs Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 6(a)-(d), 7. In particular, Downs states that he is ‘‘virtually certain that Reverend Kim’s killing was motivated by political considerations.’’ Downs Supp. Decl. ¶ 7. Hawk adds that in DPRK’s penal camps, ‘‘prisoners are not formally arrested, charged (or even told of their offense), or tried in any sort of judicial procedure.’’ Hawk Decl. ¶ 11. The South Korean court decision and the expert evidence reflect that Reverend Kim was abducted at the behest of DPRK security forces, not in accordance with any legitimate judicial or other process, due to Kim’s religious work and assistance to North Korean refugees. Therefore, the plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that any mistreatment of Reverend Kim was done purposefully. However, the plaintiffs’ submissions do not establish the severity of the treatment of Reverend Kim in particular, or that his treatment amounts to torture under the