120 414 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES ly for some, figuratively for all. Men who once had been outgoing fathers, husbands, and friends became angry, reclusive, or withdrawn. See, e.g., Pls.’ Ex. 1, Vol. 5 at 4, Dkt. 32-7; id. at 32; id. at 55. Some remained ‘‘captive emotionally and psychologically long after’’ being physically freed. Id. at 5. Many suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and a variety of muscular, spine, and joint ailments. See, e.g., Pls.’ Ex. 1, Vol. 1 at 60. The crew’s families also suffered. As their loved ones endured prolonged captivity, family members ‘‘lived in constant and torturous fear’’ and ‘‘suffered severe distress at the thought of never seeing [them] again.’’ Pls.’ Ex. 1, Vol. 5 at 61; see also id. at 68. After the crewmen returned, their family members’ distress often continued with ‘‘recurring nightmares,’’ ‘‘separation anxiety,’’ and a belief of being ‘‘robbed of [a] childhood’’ due to the difficulty of building a relationship with a frequently angry father. Id. at 32, 54, 74. quirement ‘‘provides foreign sovereigns a special protection’’ before a court reaches default judgment, Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 775 F.3d 419, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2014), ‘‘neither Rule [55(d) ] nor § 1608(e) relieves the sovereign from the duty to defend cases,’’ Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 242 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). In fact, ‘‘[u]ncontroverted factual allegations that are supported by admissible evidence are taken as true.’’ Warmbier, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 42; see also Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 424 F. Supp. 2d 74, 82 (D.D.C. 2006). And default judgments under § 1608(e) may rely on the plaintiffs’ affidavits and declarations and on public record evidence because so ‘‘long as the evidence itself is admissible’’ the uncontroverted evidence’s ‘‘form or type is irrelevant TTT as to whether [the plaintiffs] have satisfied their burden of production.’’ Owens I, 864 F.3d at 788–89. B. II. LEGAL STANDARDS Before entering default judgment, the Court must determine whether the plaintiffs have established their claims by satisfactory evidence. To recover under the FSIA’s private cause of action against foreign state sponsors of terrorism, the plaintiffs must establish subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, standing, and liability. A. Default Judgment [4–8] A plaintiff can obtain default judgment by ‘‘establish[ing] his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). This standard ‘‘mirrors’’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(d), which governs default judgements against the U.S. government. Owens v. Republic of Sudan (Owens I), 864 F.3d 751, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Though this re- Subject Matter Jurisdiction This Court has ‘‘original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state TTT as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). The decisive issue here is whether North Korea, a foreign state, is entitled to immunity. [9–11] The Court ‘‘begins with a presumption of immunity’’ for foreign states, and U.S. courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims against foreign states unless certain exceptions under the FSIA apply. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 734 F.3d 1175, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2013); 28 U.S.C. § 1604. But ‘‘if a plaintiff satisfies his burden of production [that an exception to immunity applies] and the defendant fails to present