HAN KIM v. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA Cite as 774 F.3d 1044 (D.C. Cir. 2014) probably the defendant’s negligence which caused the accident.’’ 2A STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE, & ALFRED W. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS 508 n. 30 (2009). Or take the well-known McDonnell Douglas formula for making out a Title VII claim. Because a plaintiff faces ‘‘difficulty TTT in proving the motives behind an employer’s actions’’ in a race-discrimination case, the Supreme Court has held that, in order to make out a prima facie case, he need only show that he is a member of a protected class and that he was denied an open position for which he was qualified and that remains open. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 950 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817). This inference makes sense, as ‘‘common experience tells us’’ that such facts are normally evidence of a ‘‘discriminatory motive.’’ Id. at 951. [1] Similarly, plaintiffs like the Kims will find it difficult to prove what happened behind the walls of a North Korean labor camp because the government has made all but certain that that evidence does not exist. But ‘‘common experience tells us’’ that where a plaintiff has produced compelling, admissible evidence that the regime abducted the victim and that it routinely tortures and kills the people it abducts, the courts can assume that the defendant probably tortured and killed the victim. Given Congress’s purpose—holding state sponsors of terrorism responsible for their crimes—such evidence is sufficient to ‘‘satisf[y] the court.’’ International tribunals with experience in these kinds of cases have taken the same approach. For instance, the Inter– American Court of Human Rights—the United States is a signatory to the Court’s underlying treaty, though not a state party—has recognized that circumstantial evidence is ‘‘especially important’’ in cases of 1049 forced disappearance, Radilla–Pacheco v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter– Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 209, ¶ 222 (Nov. 23, 2009), because ‘‘this type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim.’’ Velásquez–Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 4, ¶ 131 (July 29, 1988). So where ‘‘it has not been directly shown that [the victim] was physically tortured, his kidnapping and imprisonment by governmental authorities, who have been shown to subject detainees to indignities, cruelty and torture, [may] constitute’’ proof of that treatment. Id. ¶ 187. III. We thus turn to the question of whether the Kims have met their burden of producing evidence ‘‘satisfactory to the court.’’ Mindful that we must draw our ‘‘findings of fact and conclusions of law from admissible testimony in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence,’’ Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F.Supp.2d 19, 21 n. 1 (D.D.C.2001), we begin with what we know for sure: that North Korean agents abducted Reverend Kim. A South Korean court convicted a DPRK intelligence agent for planning and executing that kidnapping, see supra p. 1045, and the district court took judicial notice of that decision under Rule 201. See Kim, 950 F.Supp.2d at 35. Two experts, moreover—just the kind of experts whose testimony we have credited in FSIA default actions, see Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1131–32 (D.C.Cir.2004), and whose testimony is doubtless admissible, see Fed.R.Evid. 702—reported that victims of forced disappearance in North Korea usually suffer torture and that Reverend Kim’s political