WARMBIER v. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA Cite as 356 F.Supp.3d 30 (D.D.C. 2018) violent actions, these plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for their loss, pain, mental anguish, and suffering.’’ Kim, 87 F.Supp.3d at 290. There is no question, based on their moving live testimony, that Fred and Cindy were close with Otto and miss him greatly. The circumstances surrounding Otto’s detention made North Korea’s acts particularly agonizing for his parents. While North Korea detained Otto, this totalitarian state permitted almost no facts regarding his condition to be known, and Fred and Cindy constantly worried about their son, unsure of what was happening to him. See Stansell v. Republic of Cuba, 217 F.Supp.3d 320, 347 (D.D.C. 2016) (spouse received award of $ 12 million where ‘‘[t]he pain and suffering she has experienced were magnified by the initial lack of information surrounding [victim’s] death’’ and where she had to spend years learning ‘‘exactly what happened’’). Moreover, families of torture and hostage-taking victims ‘‘are typically awarded greater damages than are the families of victims of a single attack,’’ because in the former cases, ‘‘the afflicted party not only had to cope with the grief that follows the loss of a loved one, but—at the time of the event—was also forced to endure unending anxiety and an extended period of extreme distress over the health and safety of their captive family member.’’ Oveissi, 768 F.Supp.2d at 27. Finally, North Korea returned Otto with such extensive brain damage that Otto’s parents witnessed his discomfort, monstrous condition and, finally, his death shortly after his return. [37] Having examined closely the facts of this particular case, Fred and Cindy Warmbier are entitled to $ 15 million each, to account for their ‘‘first-hand observations and acute memories of [their] child’s death,’’ Braun, 228 F.Supp.3d at 86, and their agonizing wait for him to return home, see Kim, 87 F.Supp.3d at 290 59 (awarding $ 15 million each to brother and son of victim kidnapped and killed by North Korea). 5. Punitive Damages (All Plaintiffs) [38, 39] The plaintiffs also seek punitive damages, which are awarded not to compensate the victims, but to ‘‘punish outrageous behavior and deter such outrageous conduct in the future.’’ Kim, 87 F.Supp.3d at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 907 F.Supp.2d 93, 105 (D.D.C. 2012) ); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979). Punitive damages are warranted where ‘‘defendants supported, protected, harbored, aided, abetted, enabled, sponsored, conspired with, and subsidized a known terrorist organization whose modus operandi included the targeting, brutalization, and murder of American citizens and others.’’ Baker, 775 F.Supp.2d at 85. North Korea’s conduct toward Otto justifies the imposition of significant punitive damages here. See, e.g., Hekmati, 278 F.Supp.3d at 166 (punitive damages awarded where plaintiff was held in solitary confinement, beaten, threatened, and psychologically battered for years in Iran). [40] In determining the appropriate amount of punitive damages, courts consider ‘‘(1) the character of the defendants’ act, (2) the nature and extent of harm to the plaintiffs that the defendants caused or intended to cause, (3) the need for deterrence, and (4) the wealth of the defendants.’’ Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F.Supp.2d 24, 41 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Acosta, 574 F.Supp.2d at 30). Taking these factors into account, several approaches have been articulated for calculation of the appropriate amount of punitive damages in state-sponsored terrorism cases. One approach is to multiply the foreign state’s ‘‘annual expenditures on