52 356 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES Otto’s detention. Otto’s mother stated that, ‘‘we were told by all the government officials we met with that we should stay quiet and not speak out against North Korea because doing so would probably mean that Otto would be punished for what we said.’’ C. W. Decl. ¶ 19. In June 2017, Joseph Yun, the former U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy at the State Department, told Fred Warmbier that North Korean representatives ‘‘won’t release Otto’’ if the Warmbiers spoke to the media about Otto’s detention. F. W. Decl. ¶ 18. In sum, North Korea used Otto’s detention to ‘‘control’’ the ‘‘dialogue the whole time,’’ H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 82–83 (C. W.), and Otto’s parents were ‘‘[t]errified,’’ ‘‘afraid to TTT speak out or discuss’’ Otto ‘‘with anyone,’’ id. at 16, 23 (F. W.). This same fear was shared by Otto’s siblings, id. at 45 (G. W.); F. W. Decl. ¶ 7, and Otto’s friends, who also declined to speak to the media about North Korea’s detention of Otto, H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 59–60 (C. W.). c. Extrajudicial Killing Next, North Korea’s treatment of Otto amounted to an extrajudicial killing. Under Section 1605A(h)(7), ‘‘extrajudicial killing’’ has the meaning given to it in the TVPA, which defines an extrajudicial killing as: a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note). ‘‘On its face, this definition contains three elements: (1) a killing; (2) that is deliberated; and (3) is not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court.’’ Owens, 864 F.3d at 770. [21] As to the first element, the plaintiffs acknowledge that ‘‘the precise cause of the condition that caused Otto’s death is unknowable,’’ Pls.’ Mot. at 29, but there is overwhelming evidence that North Korea’s barbaric acts were a substantial factor in causing Otto’s death. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, ‘‘jurisdictional causation’’ is evaluated under a ‘‘proximate cause’’ standard, which requires ‘‘some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered,’’ such that the act was a ‘‘substantial factor,’’ and the victim’s injury was ‘‘reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence’’ of the defendant’s act. Owens, 864 F.3d at 794. Here, North Korea released Otto from his detention with such irrevocable, extensive brain damage that this resulted in Otto’s death. Kanter Decl. ¶¶ 9, 16, 21. Dr. Kanter opined, ‘‘based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty,’’ that Otto ‘‘died because of his brain injury,’’ which ‘‘was caused by the sustained cessation of blood flow to the brain, an injury occurring in North Korea after the last video that was released of him from his trial and sentencing.’’ Id. ¶ 21. After reviewing brain scans taken when Otto returned and brain scans from North Korea, Dr. Kanter opined that ‘‘the brain injury occurred in the weeks prior to’’ an April 2016 brain scan taken in North Korea. Id. ¶ 17. Dr. Kanter ‘‘diagnosed [Otto’s] brain injury as severe and unrecoverable,’’ concluding Otto ‘‘could have continued indefinitely with artificial’’ life support, ‘‘but he could not have lived without that assistance.’’ Id. ¶ 20. As to North Korea’s alternative public claim that Otto died from botulism, F. W. Decl. ¶ 24, Dr. Kanter’s team conducted on Otto an ‘‘electromyography study,’’ which tests for ‘‘neuromuscular junction dysfunction,’’ ‘‘an important feature of botulism,’’ Kanter Decl. ¶ 13. The test ‘‘was normal, indicat-