44 356 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES munity under the FSIA or another international agreement. [12–14] Foreign governments are generally immunized from lawsuits brought against them in the United States unless an FSIA exception applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604; Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 782 F.3d 9, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The plaintiffs invoke jurisdiction under the FSIA’s terrorism exception, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, see Pls.’ Mot. at 9, which provides that ‘‘[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case TTT in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act TTT,’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). Subject matter jurisdiction under this terrorism exception may be exercised when the plaintiff establishes the following four elements: (1) ‘‘the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time [of] the act TTT or was so designated as a result of such act, and TTT remains so designated when the claim is filed,’’ id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); (2) ‘‘the claimant or the victim was, at the time [of] the act TTT a national of the United States,’’ id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii); (3) ‘‘in a case in which the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been brought, the claimant has afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim,’’ id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii); and (4) the plaintiff seeks monetary damages ‘‘for personal injury or death caused by ‘torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act,’ if ‘engaged in by an official, employee, or agent’ of a foreign country,’’ Mohammadi, 782 F.3d at 14 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) ). These four elements, which are discussed below, have been satisfactorily proven here. 1. First Element: North Korea Was Timely Designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism With respect to the first element, North Korea was designated a state sponsor of terrorism, in part due to Otto’s detention and abusive treatment resulting in his death. North Korea was first designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the State Department in 1988. See Notice, Determination Pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979; North Korea, 53 Fed. Reg. 3477–01 (Feb. 5, 1988). The State Department, however, rescinded that determination in 2008. Notice, Rescission of Determination Regarding North Korea, 73 Fed. Reg. 63540–01 (Oct. 24, 2008). The State Department redesignated North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism in November 2017, and that designation has not been rescinded. See Notice, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST), 82 Fed. Reg. 56100–01 (Nov. 27, 2017). North Korea thus ‘‘remain[ed] so designated when’’ the plaintiffs filed their claims in April 2018. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); see also Compl. at 1, 21. Notwithstanding that North Korea was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism ‘‘at the time’’ of Otto’s detention in January 2016 or by the time of his subsequent release in June 2017, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), subject matter jurisdiction is established if the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism ‘‘as a result of such act,’’ id. Here, the State Department’s designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism was, at least in part, a result of North Korea’s detention and mistreatment of