WARMBIER v. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA Cite as 356 F.Supp.3d 30 (D.D.C. 2018) 43 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2) (authorizing court to ‘‘consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion’’ when adverse party ‘‘fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact’’). Section 1608(e), thus, ‘‘does not require a court to step into the shoes of the defaulting party and pursue every possible evidentiary challenge.’’ Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2017). ‘‘This is part of the risk a sovereign runs when it does not appear and alert the court to evidentiary problems.’’ Id. at 786. tions omitted). ‘‘Eyewitnesses in a state that sponsors terrorism are similarly difficult to locate and may be unwilling to testify for fear of retaliation,’’ and ‘‘[t]he sovereigns themselves often fail to appear and to participate in discovery.’’ Id. Accordingly, ‘‘[w]ith a dearth of firsthand evidence, reliance upon secondary materials and the opinions of experts is often critical in order to establish the factual basis of a claim under the FSIA terrorism exception.’’ Id. [9, 10] In a FSIA default proceeding, a district court can find that the evidence presented is satisfactory ‘‘when the plaintiff shows ‘her claim has some factual basis,’ TTT even if she might not have prevailed in a contested proceeding.’’ Id. at 785 (citations omitted). ‘‘This lenient standard is particularly appropriate for a FSIA terrorism case, for which firsthand evidence and eyewitness testimony is difficult or impossible to obtain from an absent and likely hostile sovereign.’’ Id. Thus, courts are accorded ‘‘an unusual degree of discretion over evidentiary rulings in a FSIA case against a defaulting state sponsor of terrorism.’’ Id. This ‘‘broad discretion extends to the admission of expert testimony, which, even in the ordinary case, ‘does not constitute an abuse of discretion merely because the factual bases for an expert’s opinion are weak.’ ’’ Id. (quoting Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ). Indeed, ‘‘[t]he testimony of expert witnesses is of crucial importance in terrorism cases TTT because firsthand evidence of terrorist activities is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain,’’ ‘‘[v]ictims of terrorist attacks, if not dead, are often incapacitated and unable to testify about their experiences,’’ and ‘‘[p]erpetrators of terrorism typically lie beyond the reach of the courts and go to great lengths to avoid detection.’’ Id. at 787 (cita- III. DISCUSSION [11] In a FSIA case, ‘‘[a] default judgment may be entered when (1) the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, (2) personal jurisdiction is properly exercised over the defendants, (3) the plaintiffs have presented satisfactory evidence to establish their claims against the defendants, and (4) the plaintiffs have satisfactorily proven that they are entitled to the monetary damages they seek.’’ Braun v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 228 F.Supp.3d 64, 75 (D.D.C. 2017); accord Akins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 332 F.Supp.3d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2018). Each of these requirements is addressed seriatim below. A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction This Court may exercise ‘‘original jurisdiction’’ over a foreign state ‘‘without regard to amount in controversy’’ in ‘‘nonjury civil action[s]’’ seeking ‘‘relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605–1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). As the plaintiffs have not demanded a jury trial, see Civil Cover Sheet at 2, ECF No. 1-1, and they seek in personam relief, see Compl. at 21, the remaining question is whether North Korea is entitled to im-