HAN KIM v. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA Cite as 950 F.Supp.2d 29 (D.D.C. 2013) quent courts, see, e.g., Gates, 580 F.Supp.2d at 63, have adopted as the standard that the plaintiffs must put forth a ‘‘legally sufficient prima facie case.’’ See, e.g., Kilburn, 699 F.Supp.2d at 150. Interpreting the ‘‘satisfactory to the court’’ standard to require a legally sufficient prima facie case best accounts for the posture of default proceedings under the FSIA. Where the defendant has not participated in the proceedings and there has been no opportunity for discovery, plaintiffs cannot be expected to meet a typical standard for judgment as a matter of law. However, the plaintiff’s evidence must be rigorous enough to support the facts necessary for jurisdiction. [3] In FSIA default proceedings, ‘‘the court may accept as true the plaintiffs’ uncontroverted evidence.’’ Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 603 F.Supp.2d 148, 155 (D.D.C.2009) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F.Supp.2d 97, 100 (D.D.C. 2000)); see also Gates, 580 F.Supp.2d at 63 (same); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F.Supp. 1239, 1243 (S.D.Fla.1997) (same). The evidence provided, however, is subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F.Supp.2d 19, 21 n. 1 (D.D.C. 2001) (noting that ‘‘[i]n the absence of defense counsel, the Court used particular care to draw the TTT findings of fact and conclusions of law from admissible testimony in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence’’). Hearsay evidence therefore is normally inadmissible because it lacks sufficient indicia of reliability. Expert witnesses, however, may rely on hearsay evidence to reach their conclusions. Fed. R.Evid. 703. Plaintiffs may present their evidence in the form of affidavits or declarations, see Campuzano, 281 F.Supp.2d at the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict’’). In 35 268 (citing Weinstein, 184 F.Supp.2d at 19), and an evidentiary hearing is not required before a default judgment against a foreign state is entered. See Ben–Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540 F.Supp.2d 39, 43 (D.D.C.2008). III. PLAINTIFFS’ EVIDENCE [4] Plaintiffs have submitted their own declarations, as well as declarations from family member Dani Butler, and from multiple experts on North Korea. Exhibits include congressional resolutions relating to Reverend Kim’s abduction, and press materials, book excerpts and reports from human rights organizations and the U.S. State Department about North Korea. The plaintiffs rely in particular on the decision of a South Korean court that tried and convicted a DPRK intelligence agent for crimes including the abduction of Reverend Kim. Plaintiffs have provided a sworn English translation of that decision. See Declaration of J.D. Kim (certifying translation of Decision of Seoul Joong Ang Ji Bang Court, Criminal Part 23 (‘‘South Korean court decision’’)). The judgment of the South Korean court is a proper subject of judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201 to establish the fact of foreign litigation and the resulting actions of the foreign court. Fed.R.Evid. 201 (permitting judicial notice of a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned); see, e.g., Jordan (Bermuda) Inv. Co., Ltd. v. Hunter Green Invs. Ltd., 154 F.Supp.2d 682, 689 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (taking judicial notice of foreign court judgment); Luxpro Corp. v. Apple Inc., No. C 10–03058 JSW, 2011 WL 1086027, at *3 (N.D.Cal. March 24, this light, the standards actually applied in Hill and Ungar are virtually identical.