450 723 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES the best things North Korea was able to offer the PFLP was its intimate links to the JRA. The JRA, in turn, functioned as an effective intermediary through which Pyongyang’s connections with the PFLP could be disguised. (Id.) select operatives who had resided at some time in North Korea to participate in the Lod Airport Attack because North Korea wished to have a certain level of deniability. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 68, ln. 6–14) Following the introduction of JRA terrorist leaders to Habash and other leaders of the PFLP, the two terrorist groups maintained contacts and even trained together in Beirut. With the prospects so poor for starting a revolution in Japan, the JRA found the state of the Palestinian struggle far more advanced and an attractive means of providing the JRA with the opportunity for attaining a profile as a viable revolutionary group on the international stage. (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 19) The JRA could no longer function in Japan, however, because much of its leadership had either been arrested, killed, or had relocated to North Korea. Thus North Korea played a vital role in the JRA’s development; it was the location from which contacts with Japan were maintained and new cadre recruited. (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 39) North Korea and CGIB became the primary patrons of the JRA and greatly influenced its direction and policies. In fact, at the time of the Lod Airport Attack, North Korea was the only state sponsoring the JRA. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 64, ln. 2) And the JRA, in turn, was mindful of the sensitivities of its sponsor. Prof. Rubin testified that the JRA deliberately did not want to During his visit to North Korea in September 1970, Habash recruited JRA members to carry out attacks for the PFLP. (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 44) Accompanied by North Korean officials, Habash visited the JRA hijackers, and himself requested that the JRA provide operatives to perpetuate the Lod Airport Attack. (Id.) Importantly, the Lod Airport Attack could not have been executed without the JRA, because PFLP operatives themselves, of Middle Eastern origin, would have been sure to arouse the suspicion and scrutiny of Israeli security.12 It was also vital for the operation that all PFLP–JRA contacts come about through North Korean channels, and were under its auspices. While preparing for the attack, the JRA members were trained either in North Korea or, in the case of Kozo, were sent through earlier training with the PFLP arranged by North Korean intelligence assets.13 (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 46) nap a Japanese student to North Korea, among other operations. (Exhibit No. 6, ¶¶ 40–43) 13. Several credible news sources, including The New York Times, reported several months after the attack that State Department Spokesman Charles W. Bray confirmed that North Korea had been supplying arms and other military assistance to PFLP prior to the Terrorist Attack. According to evidence later presented to a Congressional Committee on May 14, 1975, at least some of the JRA terrorists who perpetrated the attack were actually trained in North Korea. 12. This point was corroborated by Sarig in his trial testimony. He asserted that the PFLP knew that Japanese nationals would not be scrutinized by Israeli security in the same manner as Arabs traveling from Lebanon. (Exhibit No. 1, p. 32) Rubin also further testified that Japanese operatives could ‘‘elude detection [by the Israelis] more easily.’’ (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 70, ln. 17–25) According to Prof. Rubin, the Lod Airport Attack constituted the consummation of a tripartite relationship between North Korea, the JRA, and the PFLP. (Exhibit No. 6, ¶ 53) North Korea provided both terrorist groups with material support, re-