CALDERON–CARDONA v. DEM. PEOPLE’S REP. OF KOREA Cite as 723 F.Supp.2d 441 (D.Puerto Rico 2010) [2] Here, plaintiffs have met the conditions set forth in section 1605A: First, this case is an action for money damages. [3] Second, the Lod Airport Attack was clearly an act of extrajudicial killing within the meaning of section 1605A.22 The attack was an act of extrajudicial killing within the meaning of section 1605(A)(a)(1) because Carmelo and 27 other innocent persons were killed. Congress specifically permitted actions for ‘‘personal injury TTT that was caused by an act of TTT extrajudicial killing’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, section 1605A(a)(1) does not require that the injury to a plaintiff result from the actual ‘‘extrajudicial killing,’’ but rather from an ‘‘act of extrajudicial killing.’’ A deadly terrorist attack, taken as a whole, clearly constitutes an ‘‘act’’ of extrajudicial killing. See Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F.Supp.2d 258, 270 (D.D.C.2003) (finding that plaintiffs injured in suicide bombing were entitled to bring an action under section 1605(a)(7) because other persons were killed in the bombing). Third, at trial, plaintiffs clearly demonstrated that, through their officials, employees and agents, who were acting pursuant to defendants’ official policies and therefore within the scope of their office, employment and agency, the defendants provided material support and resources to 22. Section 1605A(h)(7) adopts the definition of extrajudicial killing contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, i.e. ‘‘a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation.’’ 459 the JRA, PFLP and their operatives, within the meaning section 1605A, for the specific purpose of carrying out acts of extrajudicial killing such as the Lod Airport Attack. Fourth, section 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) further provides that a claim under section 1605A shall be heard when the ‘‘action [is] filed under this section [1605A] by reason of section 1083(c)(3) of’’ the NDAA and the defendant ‘‘was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism when the original action TTT under section 1605(a)(7) TTT was filed.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). As discussed supra, plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to section 1083(c)(3) of the NDAA as related to their original D.C. Action. When the D.C. Action was filed, North Korea had already been officially designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.23 Thus, the condition that the foreign state defendant ‘‘was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism when the original action TTT under section 1605(a)(7) TTT was filed’’ is satisfied here. Finally, section 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) requires that ‘‘the claimant or the victim was, at the time the act TTT occurred TTT a national of the United States.’’ Plaintiffs have provided evidence that both they and the victims (i.e. Carmelo and Pablo) were United States citizens at the time of the Lod Airport Attack.24 23. North Korea was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1988. (Exhibit 8, ¶ 39) See Notice, Determination Pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979; North Korea, 53 Fed.Reg. 3477 (Feb. 5, 1988). North Korea’s designation was rescinded on October 11, 2008. Id. See Notice, Rescission of Determination Regarding North Korea, 73 Fed.Reg. 63540 (Oct. 24, 2008). 24. See Exhibits 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 and Exhibit A to Exhibit 46 and Exhibit A to Exhibit 47.