128 414 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES allowed to leave, and that captivity only worsened, lasting for eleven months. See supra Part I.B. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that the crew members endured forced captivity, were conscious of their captivity, and were harmed by it. North Korea is liable to the crew members and their estates for this false imprisonment. See Massie, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 75– 76. [42–45] Finally, ‘‘one who by extreme and reckless conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress.’’ Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 659 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1)). ‘‘Acts of terrorism are by their very definition extreme and outrageous and intended to cause the highest degree of emotional distress.’’ Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 22 (D.D.C. 2009) (citations omitted). The ‘‘intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity.’’ Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j. For eleven months, the crew members were forced to watch the North Koreans torture their fellow crewmen while anticipating their own forthcoming torture or possible execution. See supra Part I.B. When they returned home, the trauma that these men withstood left lasting psychological damage—many suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. See supra Part I.B.2.iv. The uncontroverted evidence shows that for nearly a year these men suffered extremely intense physical and emotional distress that has had lasting effects on their lives. North Korea is liable to the crew member plaintiffs and their estates for this intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Massie, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 76. ii. Family Members and Their Estates [46] Section 1605A(c) ‘‘expressly contemplates the award of solatium damages to the close relatives of terrorism victims.’’ Fritz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 324 F. Supp. 3d 54, 61–62 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing 28 U.S.C. 1605A(c)). The ‘‘legal representatives’’ of those close relatives—here, their estates—also may bring solatium claims on their behalf. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c); see, e.g., Allan v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 17cv-0338, 2019 WL 2185037, at *7 (D.D.C. May 21, 2019) (awarding solatium damages to estate plaintiff); Relvas v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 14-cv-01752, 2018 WL 1092445, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2018) (same); Akins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 332 F. Supp. 3d 1, 45, 47 (D.D.C. 2018) (same); Stansell, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 332, 334, 344–45 (same). [47–50] Under the FSIA, solatium is ‘‘indistinguishable from an [intentional infliction of emotional distress] claim.’’ Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 85; see also Estate of Heiser, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 27 n.4. While the Restatement appears to limit claims to those who were ‘‘present at the time,’’ Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(2), it also suggests in a caveat that an actor may be liable in ‘‘other circumstances’’ to someone who was not present at the time, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 caveat. ‘‘Terrorism, unique among the types of tortious activities in both its extreme methods and aims,’’ is ‘‘easily’’ one such circumstance. Estate of Heiser, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 27; see also Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27, 36 (D.D.C. 2001); Thuneibat v. Syrian Arab Republic, 167 F. Supp. 3d 22, 39 (D.D.C. 2016). In this Circuit, ‘‘relief in cases of this sort will be limited to ‘immediate family’ members.’’ Bettis, 315 F.3d at 338(excluding nieces and nephews from relief for not fitting the traditional common law definition of ‘‘immediate family’’). So long as