CALDERON–CARDONA v. DEM. PEOPLE’S REP. OF KOREA Cite as 723 F.Supp.2d 441 (D.Puerto Rico 2010) genuine identification and other Japanese government-issued documents to JRA members. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 128, ln. 17–25) North Korea had expertise in adapting photo substitution and name changes for such documents, and was able to produce high-quality forgeries. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 129, ln. 8–19) There were other significant benefits flowing to the JRA in having North Korea as a state sponsor of its terrorist activities. Because North Korea is a state, it has ‘‘natural cover and capacity to operate.’’ (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 124, ln. 8–9) For example, Prof. Gunaratna testified that there was a JRA member who was operating in Thailand with the CGIB, regarding whom he stated ‘‘[t]hey [CGIB] were bringing in counterfeit U.S. dollars from North Korea, and they were putting that money back to the U.S. dollar system in Thailand. And the Japanese Red Army member was traveling inside a North Korean diplomatic vehicle, so the Japanese Red Army used the diplomatic pouches, the diplomatic immunities, and the diplomatic privileges of North Korea.’’ (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 124, ln. 5–19) The history of the JRA, as traced from its creation until its demise, clearly demonstrates that North Korea’s state sponsorship was crucial for the JRA’s survival. Indeed, a desire for a patron state is common to all terrorist organizations. The United States State Department noted in an official publication that ‘‘[w]ithout state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations.’’ 18 (Exhibit No. 8, ¶ 37) As such, North Kore18. State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview, Country Reports on Terrorism, Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, Department of State, Washington, D.C., April 30, 2007 455 an state sponsorship of both the JRA and PFLP enabled both these terrorist groups to forge a partnership and facilitated their perpetration of terror attacks worldwide.19 Prof. Gunaratna also testified at trial that North Korean direct and indirect sponsorship of the JRA and its provisions of material support was paramount for the JRA’s survival, sustenance and operation globally. (Exhibit No. 8, ¶ 38) North Korea not only sponsored the JRA directly, but also sponsored the JRA’s operational partner PFLP as well. (Id.) Thus, all of the terrorist operations carried out by the JRA alone, and jointly with PFLP, during the period of North Korean sponsorship, including the Lod Airport Attack, are attributable to North Korea’s leadership and intelligence services. (Id.) In fact, North Korean leader Kim Il–Sung envisioned using the JRA as North Korea’s proxy well into the future—to keep the revolution continuing beyond the first generation. To this end, Kim Il–Sung instructed the JRA members living in North Korea to take Japanese wives so that their Japanese children could form the next generation of JRA fighters. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 134, ln. 17–19) The CGIB even worked with the JRA to lure Japanese women living in Europe to North Korea for the purpose of having these children, and its efforts were successful to a certain extent; roughly 17 of those children have in fact returned to live in Japan, presumably to continue the struggle. (Trial Transcript, Dec. 2, 2009, p. 134, ln. 13–25) Prof. Gunaratna highlighted another important issue at trial—namely that the JRA selection of Lod Airport as a target reflected the JRA’s primary goal of shock19. Eric Pace, ‘‘Lebanon is said to have set up Liaison Unit with Commandos’’ The New York Times, September 23, 1972 and Peter Grose, ‘‘Terrorists: Four Minutes of Horror at the Airport,’’ June 4, 1972.