124 414 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES in this context means wholly or in part as a result. See Massie, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 74 (‘‘North Korea has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism, in part due to its unlawful seizure of the Pueblo.’’); Warmbier, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 44–45 (finding that the re-designation of North Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism was ‘‘at least in part’’ a result of the capture of Otto Warmbier); see also Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 67 (concluding that Iran was designed a State Sponsor of Terrorism ‘‘in partial response’’ to a terrorist attack); Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 740 F. Supp. 2d 51, 65 (D.D.C. 2010) (similar). Just two weeks before re-designating North Korea, President Trump cited the ‘‘capture and torture of the brave American soldiers of the USS Pueblo’’ as among the most-significant of North Korea’s terrorist actions.6 These remarks, coupled with the evidence cited in Massie that the Pueblo attack also partly motivated the 1988 designation,7 satisfies the plaintiffs’ ‘‘initial burden of production.’’ Owens I, 864 F.3d at 784. And because North Korea has ‘‘fail[ed] to present any evidence in rebuttal,’’ this first element is met. Id. [23, 24] Second, all but two of the crew member plaintiffs were U.S. citizens by birth. See, e.g., Ex. 1, Vol. 1 at 10. And even those two exceptions, plaintiffs A-2 and A-44, were U.S. servicemen, enlisted in the Navy as a [redacted], respectively, and thus satisfy the second element.8 Pls.’ 6. Remarks by President Trump to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-nationalassembly-republic-korea-seoul-republickorea/; see also Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST), 82 Fed. Reg. 56100-01 (Nov. 27, 2017). 7. In Massie, Judge Kennedy concluded that North Korea’s 1988 designation was at least partly the result of the Pueblo incident. See Massie, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 74. Though North Ex. 1, Vol. 1 at 25; Pls.’ Ex. 1, Vol. 4 at 35, Dkt. 32-6. For the family member plaintiffs, all but four of them were U.S. citizens at the time of the Pueblo’s capture. See, e.g., Pls.’ Ex. 1, Vol. 5 at 2. And as to those four non-U.S. citizens, the ‘‘plain text and plain meaning’’ of the provision indicate that ‘‘[t]he claimant and victim need not both be American citizens.’’ Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 697 F.3d 561, 570 (7th Cir. 2012). Instead, plaintiffs must either satisfy the requirements for standing themselves or have ‘‘claims [that] are derived from claims where the victims were U.S. government employees at the time of the attack.’’ Estate of Doe v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2011). Because the family member plaintiffs’ claims all derive from U.S. nationals or U.S. armed forces members, the Court must hear their claims. Similarly, the estate plaintiffs’ claims shall be heard because the ‘‘victim[s]’’ were either U.S. nationals or members of the U.S. armed forces. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(i)(2). Third, the claimants ‘‘afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate.’’ Id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii). The claimants sent an offer to arbitrate and its Korean translation to the defendants, which, relying on the language of Simpson, offered to submit the matter to a ‘‘third-party organization TTT with extensive experience arbitrating international Korea was de-designated since Massie and then re-designated in 2017, at least one other court in this district has considered evidence connected to the 1988 designation in ascertaining the basis for the 2017 re-designation. See Warmbier, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 44–45 (citing Massie, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 74). 8. Plaintiff A-44 was a naturalized citizen at the time of the Pueblo’s capture. Pls.’ Ex. 1, Vol. 4 at 35. Plaintiff A-2 became a naturalized citizen in 1970. Pls.’ Ex. 1, Vol. 1 at 25.