DOE v. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA Cite as 414 F.Supp.3d 109 (D.D.C. 2019) any evidence in rebuttal, then jurisdiction attaches.’’ Owens I, 864 F.3d at 784. The relevant exception here is the statesponsored terrorism exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). This exception eliminates sovereign immunity when ‘‘(1) ‘money damages are sought,’ (2) ‘against a foreign state’ for (3) ‘personal injury or death’ that (4) ‘was caused’ (5) ‘by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources TTT for such an act.’ ’’ Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 753 F. Supp. 2d 68, 79 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1)). [12] A federal district court ‘‘shall hear a claim’’ under this exception when three conditions are met. 28 USC § 1605A(a)(2). First, the foreign state must have been ‘‘designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the act’’ giving rise to the claim occurred ‘‘or was so designated as a result of such act.’’ Id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i). Second, the claimants must have been either a ‘‘national of the United States,’’ a member of the armed forces, or an employee or contractor of the federal government who was acting in the scope of employment. Id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii). A ‘‘national of the United States’’ is either a U.S. citizen or a non-citizen who ‘‘owes permanent allegiance to the United States.’’ Id. § 1605A(h)(5) (referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22)). Third, because the torture of the crew ‘‘occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been brought,’’ the claimants must have ‘‘afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with the accepted international rules of arbitration.’’ Id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii). This offer to arbitrate need not precede the complaint. See Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 326 F.3d 230, 233–34 (D.C. Cir. 2003). C. 121 Personal Jurisdiction [13] To exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign state under the FSIA, the court must have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, and the foreign state must have been properly served. See 28 U.S.C § 1330(b). The standard for subject matter jurisdiction is described above. As for service, the FSIA enumerates four methods for serving foreign states, ‘‘in descending order of preference.’’ Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 69 (D.D.C. 2010); see 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a). The first two methods are unavailable here because there is no ‘‘special arrangement for service’’ between the U.S. and North Korea, id. § 1608(a)(1), and North Korea is not party to an ‘‘applicable international convention on service,’’ id. § 1608(a)(2). The third method, effected here, requires ‘‘sending a copy of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with a translation of each into the official language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.’’ Id. § 1608(a)(3). This Circuit has held that ‘‘foreign states are not persons protected by the Fifth Amendment,’’ leaving no need to conduct a minimum contacts analysis. Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted). D. Standing A plaintiff’s standing under the FSIA once depended on whether the plaintiff could bring its claim under state law. But that is no longer true. Before 2008, ‘‘a plaintiff suing a foreign sovereign for acts of state-sponsored terrorism had to rely solely upon state substantive law’’ because the FSIA provided no federal cause of