CALDERON–CARDONA v. DEM. PEOPLE’S REP. OF KOREA Cite as 723 F.Supp.2d 441 (D.Puerto Rico 2010) Exhibit No. 77: United States Dept. of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1988. (Previously referenced in Exhibit No. 8, fn. 18) Conclusions of Law [1] The FSIA was enacted in 1976 and is the sole basis of jurisdiction over foreign states in the federal courts. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428, 434, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989). The FSIA codifies the ‘‘restrictive theory’’ of sovereign immunity under which foreign states are generally immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States subject to specific exceptions. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488–89, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983). As originally enacted, the exceptions to immunity under the FSIA included cases in which a foreign state had waived its immunity and those involving commercial activities of a foreign state with a nexus to United States. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488, 103 S.Ct. 1962 (discussing main exceptions to immunity under the FSIA). In April 1996, however, Congress enacted a ‘‘terrorism exception’’ to immunity under the FSIA as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Pub.L. No. 104–132, § 221(a)(1)(C), 110 Stat. 1214, 1241. That exception, which was codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), lifted the sovereign immunity of designated foreign state sponsors of terrorism in civil actions brought by American citizens for terrorist attacks carried out by those foreign states or for which the foreign states had provided material support and resources. Later in 1996, Congress amended the FSIA (the ‘‘Flatow Amendment’’) to create a cause of action for terrorism against officials, employees and agents of those foreign states. See Pub.L. 104–208, § 589, 457 110 (1996), 110 Stat. 3009–1, 3009–172 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note). Federal courts initially construed section 1605(a)(7) and the Flatow Amendment, read in tandem, as creating a federal cause of action against the foreign state itself. See e.g. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C.1998). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ultimately held, however, that neither section 1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment created a cause of action against the foreign state itself. See Cicippio–Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C.Cir.2004). Following Cicippio–Puleo, the federal courts began to apply non-federal tort remedies (usually under the law of the state in which the plaintiff or decedent was domiciled) to determine the liability of foreign states sued under section 1605(a)(7). This methodology resulted in judgments in which plaintiffs injured by the same terrorist attack received vastly different awards—including cases where some plaintiffs-victims were denied recovery entirely while others were awarded significant damages. See e.g. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F.Supp.2d 25 (D.D.C.2007) (ordering that damage awards to family members of United States servicemen killed in 1983 attack on the United States Marine Corps barracks in Beirut be granted or denied on the basis of the widely disparate rules of recovery obtaining in each plaintiff’s respective state of domicile). In order to remedy this problem (and other difficulties faced by section 1605(a)(7) plaintiffs), in 2008 Congress enacted section 1083 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 4986. P.L. 110–181, January 28, 2008 (‘‘NDAA’’). Section 1083 of the NDAA replaced section 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA with a new