46 356 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES A translated copy of the Notice was served on North Korea on June 19, 2018, see Return of Service, ECF No. 12, and North Korea has failed to file an acceptance or contact Plaintiffs regarding their offer to arbitrate, Hatch Decl. ¶ 18. The plaintiffs have thus satisfied the arbitration offer requirement, under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii). See Hekmati v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 278 F.Supp.3d 145, 158 (D.D.C. 2017) (‘‘[A]n offer of arbitration was included with the documents served on Iran TTT, which is sufficient to satisfy the FSIA’s requirement.’’); Moradi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 77 F.Supp.3d 57, 66 (D.D.C. 2015) (including an offer of arbitration in the documents served on the foreign state satisfied the FSIA’s requirement). 4. Fourth Element: Actions of North Korea Qualify for the Terrorism Exception Finally, as detailed below, the plaintiffs have provided ample evidence to establish the fourth element: that their damages arise from North Korea’s barbaric mistreatment of Otto, including ‘‘torture,’’ ‘‘hostage taking,’’ and ‘‘extrajudicial killing.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). a. Torture ‘‘[T]orture,’’ for purposes of the FSIA’s terrorism exception, is defined by ‘‘the meaning given’’ to that term in the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (‘‘TVPA’’). 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(7). The TVPA, drawing from the 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘‘Torture Convention’’), defines torture as follows: any act, directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind. Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(b)(1), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note) ); see also Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (explaining that the TVPA’s definition of torture ‘‘borrows extensively from the [Torture Convention]’’). [15, 16] To establish torture, the plaintiffs must show that the conduct was sufficiently severe and purposeful. See Price, 294 F.3d at 92–93. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, ‘‘suffering alone is insufficient to establish a claim under the FSIA’s terrorism exception. To qualify as torture, the mistreatment must be purposeful—that is, the defendant must have targeted the victim, for instance, to punish him for his religious or political beliefs.’’ Kim, 774 F.3d at 1050. Severity ‘‘is crucial to ensuring that the conduct proscribed by the Convention and the TVPA is sufficiently extreme and outrageous to warrant the universal condemnation that the term ‘torture’ both connotes and invokes.’’ Price, 294 F.3d at 92. ‘‘The critical issue is the degree of pain and suffering that the alleged torturer intended to, and actually did, inflict upon the victim,’’ and ‘‘[t]he more intense, lasting, or heinous the agony, the more likely it is to be torture.’’ Id. at 93. Thus, ‘‘torture does not automatically result whenever individuals in official custody are subjected even to direct physical assault,’’ as ‘‘[n]ot all police brutality, not every instance of excessive force used