DOE v. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA Cite as 414 F.Supp.3d 109 (D.D.C. 2019) 2. Theories of Liability [33] It is not enough for the plaintiffs to show that the North Koreans caused injuries through those particular acts. The FSIA requires the plaintiffs to ‘‘prove a theory of liability’’ found in ‘‘well-established principles of law, such as those found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.’’ Worley, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 334–35 (citations omitted). The crew members and their estates, the crew’s immediate family members and their estates, and plaintiff C17 bring claims under different theories of liability. North Korea is liable under each theory for its acts of torture, hostagetaking, and extrajudicial killing. i. The Crew Members and Their Estates The crew members and their estates bring claims under the theories of assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37–40, 44. [34–36] Assault ‘‘occurs when one person (a) ‘acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other TTT or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension.’ ’’ Stansell v. Republic of Cuba, 217 F. Supp. 3d 320, 343 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21(1)). ‘‘ ‘Harmful contact’ is that which causes ‘any physical impairment of the condition of another’s body, or physical pain or illness.’ ’’ Id. at 342 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 15). The North Koreans repeatedly beat, kicked, spat on, and interrogated the crew members, accused them of being spies, and denied them medical attention. See supra Part I.B.2. The North Koreans routinely threatened the crew members’ lives, causing them to fear death and further violence. Such acts of torture ‘‘by their very nature’’ are meant to cause harm and instill fear of harms to 127 come. Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 76. Accepting the uncontroverted evidence that the crew members regularly suffered harmful contact and fear, North Korea is liable to the crew members and their estates for assault. See Massie, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 75. [37–39] Battery requires an act ‘‘intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with TTT [another person], or an imminent apprehension of such a contact’’ and the offensive contact in fact ‘‘directly or indirectly results.’’ Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18. And ‘‘bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.’’ Id. § 19. North Korea committed battery when, over the course of eleven months, its agents repeatedly beat the Pueblo’s crew, sometimes to the point of unconsciousness. See supra Part I.B.2.iii. This program of repeated torture resulted in acts of intentional, harmful, and offensive contacts, and all crew members suffered physical injuries from the acts of battery they were subjected to in captivity. Again, accepting the uncontroverted evidence that the crew members regularly suffered severe physical harm as a direct result of harmful and offensive contact, North Korea is liable to the crew members and their estates for battery. See Massie, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 75. [40, 41] False imprisonment exists ‘‘when one person ‘(a) acts intending to confine the other TTT within boundaries fixed by the actor, and (b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement of the other, and (c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.’’ Stansell, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 342–43 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35). From the moment the North Koreans boarded the Pueblo, they confined the crew members to specific locations, the crew members were aware they were not