DOE v. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA Cite as 414 F.Supp.3d 109 (D.D.C. 2019) disputes.’’ Arb. Offer Ex. 4, Dkt. 33-1 (quoting Simpson, 326 F.3d at 232). The arbitration offer accompanied the service package, but the offer need not precede the complaint. See Simpson, 326 F.3d at 233–34. B. Personal Jurisdiction [25] The Court also has personal jurisdiction over North Korea. To have personal jurisdiction over a foreign state under the FSIA, a court must have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, and the foreign state must have been properly served. See 28 U.S.C § 1330(b). As explained, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over all claims presented here. And North Korea was properly served. The first two methods for service prescribed by § 1608(a) are inapplicable here, see supra Part II.B, meaning that the claimants needed to try to serve North Korea ‘‘by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt,’’ id. § 1608(a)(3). The service package was delivered using DHL International to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of North Korea where it was signed for and accepted. Return Serv., Ex. 9, Dkt 33-1. This method of service satisfies § 1608(a)(3). See Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 646 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2011). C. Standing [26] Four groups have standing to bring a cause of action under § 1605A(c): nationals of the United States; members of the U.S. armed forces; employees or contractors of the U.S. government acting within the scope of their employment; and the legal representatives of any of these three groups. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). The 9. All family member plaintiffs were U.S. citizens by birth, with four exceptions: Plaintiffs B-46 and C-9 became naturalized citizens while the men were held hostage, Pls.’ Ex. 1, Vol. 7 at 8, 190, Dkt. 32-9, and plaintiffs B-83 125 plaintiffs in each group—crew members, family members, and their estates—have such standing. Crew members. All crew member plaintiffs were either U.S. nationals or members of the armed forces. Thus, plaintiffs A-1, A-2, A-4 through A-34, A-36, and A-38 through A-49 have standing to bring this cause of action. [27] Family members. All family member plaintiffs are currently U.S. nationals and thus also have standing.9 While foreign family members ‘‘need’’ state tort law to bring claims, U.S. nationals can rely upon § 1605A(c). Owens I, 864 F.3d at 809. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) (omitting the requirement for a plaintiff to satisfy the requirement of being a U.S. national at time of occurrence), with 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring that either the victim or claimant have satisfied the requirement ‘‘at the time the act TTT occurred’’). Thus, plaintiffs B-2 through B-72 and B-74 through B-91 have standing to bring this cause of action. [28] Estates. The estate plaintiffs also have standing under § 1605A. An estate of a plaintiff who would have had standing to sue ‘‘is expressly covered by, and entitled to bring claims under, Section 1605A(c).’’ Braun v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 228 F. Supp. 3d 64, 78–79 (D.D.C. 2017); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1) and (b)(3) (an estate’s executor, administrator, or any other person authorized by statute may bring suit). The estate plaintiffs’ decedents all would have had standing to sue in their own right because they all were U.S. citizens, members of the armed forces, or both.10 As such, the estate plaintiffs— and B-69 became naturalized citizens after the Pueblo incident, id. Vol. 4 at 38; Vol. 8 at 156–57, Dkt. 32-10. 10. See, e.g., Pls.’ Ex.1 Vol. 1 at 10, 31, 40, 55, 63; id. Vol. 5 at 7, 11, 15, 17–20; id. Vol. 6 at