DOE v. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA Cite as 414 F.Supp.3d 109 (D.D.C. 2019) eign state is not entitled to immunity.’’ Id. § 1330(a). [20] These four conditions are present. First, this is a nonjury civil action—‘‘all federal appellate courts which have considered the issue TTT have held that jury trials are not available in suits brought under the [FSIA].’’ Universal Consol. Cos., Inc. v. Bank of China, 35 F.3d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 65. Second, North Korea is a foreign state. Third, this action is in personam because the Court will exercise ‘‘personal jurisdiction over the defendants as legal persons, rather than property.’’ Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 65; see infra Part III.B. [21] Fourth, the exception to sovereign immunity for state-sponsored terrorism applies. That exception waives sovereign immunity for foreign states when five conditions exist: ‘‘(1) ‘money damages are sought,’ (2) ‘against a foreign state’ for (3) ‘personal injury or death’ that (4) ‘was caused’ (5) ‘by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources TTT for such an act.’ ’’ Anderson, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 79 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1)). Those conditions are present here. The plaintiffs seek money damages for personal injury under FSIA § 1605A(c). Am. Compl. ¶ 15. This satisfies conditions (1) and (3). The plaintiffs’ suit and the Clerk of Court’s entry of default are against North Korea itself, which is a ‘‘foreign state’’ under the FSIA. Clerk’s Entry of Default; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a), 1608. This satisfies condition (2). And the plaintiffs seek money damages for alleged ‘‘acts of torture, hostage taking, and personal injury (including assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of solatium) committed against the crew members and their immediate family members.’’ Am. 123 Compl. ¶ 19. This satisfies condition (5). That leaves condition (4)—causation. The plaintiffs allege acts of torture and hostage taking that ‘‘caused physical and psychological injuries.’’ Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36; 16–19. To establish causation, the plaintiffs must make ‘‘only a showing of proximate cause,’’ which exists so long as there is ‘‘some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered.’’ Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). The plaintiffs have made this showing. There are clear, reasonable connections between the alleged actions of the North Koreans and the injuries suffered. For example, North Korea’s capturing of the crew members and holding them as hostages was directly connected to the physical and psychological harms of false imprisonment. And the crew’s torture at North Korea’s hands involved repeated beatings that were directly connected to injuries that resulted from the assault. See supra Part I.B.2.ii. With all five conditions met, the state-sponsored terrorism exception applies. [22] Not only does the Court have subject matter jurisdiction, it must exercise that jurisdiction. Under the FSIA, the Court ‘‘shall hear a claim’’ when (1) the state had been designated a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the act occurred or ‘‘as a result of such act’’; (2) the plaintiffs were U.S. nationals, servicemen, employees or contractors for the U.S. government; and (3) the plaintiffs allowed the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2). Those requirements are met here. First, North Korea was re-designated a state sponsor of terrorism ‘‘as a result’’ of its actions against the Pueblo’s crew. Courts in this district have held that ‘‘as a result’’