122 414 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES action. Owens v. Republic of Sudan (Owens II), 924 F.3d 1256, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing Owens I, 864 F.3d at 763–765, 808). The mechanism for such ‘‘pass through’’ liability was § 1606 of the FSIA. If a sovereign immunity exception applied, § 1606 would kick in and subject foreign states to whatever state-law liability a similarly situated private individual would face. 28 U.S.C. § 1606. But § 1606 expressly applies only to § 1605 and § 1607 of the FSIA. Id. § 1606; see Owens I, 864 F.3d at 808. And in 2008, Congress moved the exception to sovereign immunity for state sponsors of terrorism—the relevant exception in this case— from § 1605 to the newly created § 1605A. Owens II, 924 F.3d at 1258. Not only that, but Congress also included in § 1605A a substantive cause of action against state sponsors of terrorism. Id. § 1606. [14] The upshot of this is twofold: FSIA claims against state sponsors of terrorism are federal causes of action that do not depend on state law. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 60 n.20 (D.D.C. 2009). And the FSIA by its terms gives standing to four groups to bring such claims: nationals of the United States; members of the U.S. armed forces; employees or contractors of the U.S. government acting within the scope of their employment; and the legal representatives of any of these three groups. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). E. Liability As mentioned, § 1605A(c) creates a cause of action against foreign state sponsors of terrorism for money damages resulting from ‘‘personal injury or death.’’ The injury or death needs to have been ‘‘caused’’ by the specific ‘‘acts’’ listed in the FSIA, including torture, hostage taking, and extrajudicial killing, committed by a foreign state, which ‘‘shall be vicariously liable for the acts of its officials, employees, or agents.’’ Id. § 1605A(c). [15, 16] To assess a plaintiff’s theories of ‘‘personal injury’’ under the FSIA, courts reference state common law and often rely on the Restatement (Second) of Torts ‘‘as a proxy for state common law.’’ Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 76; Worley, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 335. Though the FSIA cause of action contains a statute of limitations that requires an action to be brought within ten years of April 26, 1996 or within ten years of the precipitating event, see § 1605A(b), this Court lacks the ‘‘authority or discretion to sua sponte raise the terrorism exception’s statute of limitations,’’ Maalouf v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 923 F.3d 1095, 1114–15 (D.C. Cir. 2019). No party raises it here. [17] Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), this Court may enter a default judgment on the plaintiff’s claims if one party applies to the Court for that outcome. But a default judgment is ‘‘not automatic’’ and requires (1) that plaintiffs make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and (2) that the plaintiffs ‘‘establish[ ] [their] claim[s] or right[s] to relief by evidence satisfactory to the Court,’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). III. A. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Subject Matter Jurisdiction [18, 19] The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. A federal district court has ‘‘original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state TTT as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the for-