42 356 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES ing a default judgment when a party applies for that relief. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). ‘‘[S]trong policies favor resolution of disputes on their merits,’’ and therefore, ‘‘ ‘[t]he default judgment must normally be viewed as available only when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.’ ’’ Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ). [2–5] Notwithstanding its appropriateness in some circumstances, ‘‘entry of a default judgment is not automatic.’’ Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). Thus, the procedural posture of a default does not relieve a federal court of its ‘‘affirmative obligation’’ to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Additionally, ‘‘a court should satisfy itself that it has personal jurisdiction before entering judgment against an absent defendant.’’ Mwani, 417 F.3d at 6. The ‘‘plaintiffs retain ‘the burden of proving personal jurisdiction, [and] they can satisfy that burden with a prima facie showing.’ ’’ Id. (quoting Edmond v. U.S. Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ). In doing so, ‘‘they may rest their argument on their pleadings, bolstered by such affidavits and other written materials as they can otherwise obtain.’’ Id. at 7. [6] When default judgment is sought under the FSIA, a claimant must ‘‘establish[ ] his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). ‘‘This provides foreign sovereigns a special protection akin to that assured the federal government by FED. R. CIV. P. 55(e),’’ which has been renumbered by the 2007 amendment to Rule 55(d). Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 775 F.3d 419, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 26 (1976) (stating that § 1608(e) establishes ‘‘the same requirement applicable to default judgments against the U.S. Government under rule 55(e), F.R. Civ. P.’’). While the ‘‘FSIA leaves it to the court to determine precisely how much and what kinds of evidence the plaintiff must provide, requiring only that it be ‘satisfactory to the court,’ ’’ courts must be mindful that Congress enacted Section 1605A, FSIA’s terrorism exception, and Section 1608(e) with the ‘‘aim[ ] to prevent state sponsors of terrorism—entities particularly unlikely to submit to this country’s laws—from escaping liability for their sins.’’ Han Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044, 1047–48 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) ). [7, 8] With this objective in mind, the D.C. Circuit has instructed that ‘‘courts have the authority—indeed, we think, the obligation—to ‘adjust evidentiary requirements to TTT differing situations.’ ’’ Id. at 1048 (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ) (alteration adopted). Courts must draw their ‘‘findings of fact and conclusions of law from admissible testimony in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence.’’ Id. at 1049 (quoting Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F.Supp.2d 19, 21 n.1 (D.D.C. 2001) ). Uncontroverted factual allegations that are supported by admissible evidence are taken as true. Roth v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 78 F.Supp.3d 379, 386 (D.D.C. 2015) (‘‘Courts may rely on uncontroverted factual allegations that are supported by affidavits.’’ (citing Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 750 F.Supp.2d 163, 171 (D.D.C. 2010) ) ); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F.Supp.2d 53, 63 (D.D.C. 2008), aff’d, 646 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 510 F.Supp.2d 101, 103 (D.D.C. 2007) ); accord