72 592 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES 33. Rose Bucher has at all relevant times been a United States citizen and a domiciliary of the State of California. 34. The kidnaping, torture, beating and prolonged detention and holding hostage of Cdr. Bucher caused Rose Bucher to lose and be deprived of the services, support, affection, consortium, and companionship of her husband. During her husband’s captivity, Rose Bucher missed her husband’s presence, physical touch, and loving words. In addition, while suffering the mental torment of not knowing whether she would ever see her husband again, she bore the burden of caring for her family as well as the family members of the hostages. See Tr. 109, April 22, 2008. 35. While Rose Bucher received a few letters from Cdr. Bucher while he was in North Korea, she could tell that they were not his words, and just his handwriting. The letters were dictated by someone else. The letters only provided some relief to her constant stress and anxiety, as they indirectly informed her that her husband was alive. See id. 36. After his release, Cdr. Bucher remained distant with regards to talking to his wife about his feelings and thoughts of his time in North Korea. See id. at 138, 141–42. Nevertheless, he described the beatings and the torture, both physical and mental, to which he had been subjected. See id. at 110, 125–26. II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. As this action is brought against a foreign state, the Foreign Sovereign Im1. Plaintiffs brought suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338–44 (2008), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) was replaced by 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. Section 1605(a)(7) still applies to actions brought prior to the effective date of 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, however. Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d munities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq., as amended, controls. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488–89, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983); 28 U.S.C. § 1330. 2. In the Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, § 221(c), 110 Stat. 1214, 1243, Congress lifted the immunity of foreign states officially designated by the Department of State as a state sponsor of terrorism, if the foreign state commits a terrorist act or provides material support and resources to an individual or entity that commits such an act resulting in the death or personal injury of a United States citizen. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) 1. Under this Act, a foreign sovereign is not immune to suit in U.S. courts when: money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources (as defined in section 2339A of title 18) for such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency. See also H.R.Rep. No. 383, 104th Cong., 1st Session 1995 at 137–38, available at 1995 WL 731698. [1] 3. Although plaintiffs Massie, Tuck, McClarren and Cdr. Bucher were 1187, 1191–92 (D.C.Cir.2008) (‘‘the new terrorism exception in § 1605A by its terms does not provide a substitute basis for jurisdiction over all cases pending under § 1605(a)(7) TTT to claim the benefits of § 1605A, the plaintiff must file a new action under that new provision.’’). Accordingly, this court analyzes plaintiffs’ action under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).